Zero Trust Architecture

Zero Trust Architecture is what the cool kids are doing now as it becomes increasingly crucial as systems and the ways in which we interact with them become less centralized. Currently many of the techniques seem overly ambitious for supporting discrete security needs (such as managing identity and access management for software-as-a-service customers) and is more appropriate for intra-enterprise security, but there are a large number of overlapping concerns and it is worthwhile maintaining a unified (if not necessarily uniform) perspective on security needs.

Though I’ll use it herein since it seems to be the predominant phrasing, I’m personally not a fan of the “Zero Trust” terminology as it is overly extreme which anecdotally can lend itself to abuse (I’ve seen some convoluted and insecure designs implemented in the name of Zero Trust). A fundamental underpinning of security is establishing and managing trust and in that light the moniker can lead to simplistic and/or neglectful perspectives. Zero Trust eschews more implicit trust mechanisms, particularly those stemming from (network) location or zone; presumably if “trust” were designated to only refer to such incidental attributes rather than those designed for more secure authentication the term is accurate, but that deviates from common use and therefore does not seem conducive to understanding. Per Rais, et al.. “Zero Trust” is granted to the “network” which matches that narrow and confusion breeding designation (particularly given the possible interpretations of what constitutes a network although the implied meaning is clear within the full context). Alternatives such as “deperimeterization” seem to be both clearer and less prone to hype and misuse.

Deperimeterization is clearer in that it clearly positions itself as opposed to many previous practices which amounted to expecting security to be enforced at a perimeter, but similar to the trust argument perimeters or boundaries continue to exist and their impact on the larger security picture should be understood rather than seeking their annihilation. Ultimately the approach can be distilled to the notion that each severable component should be secured independently rather than expecting transitive security.

Zero Trust Networks provides a good introduction to the space as a whole with a combination of examples, practical guidance supported by case studies, and references to some of the emerging standards and best practices.

Phil Vachon provides a nice metaphorical overview of the breaking down of security perimeters in pragmatic terms in The Security Jawbreaker

Unfortunately there’s seemingly a dearth of actionable security standards in general. The NIST is coordinating such an effort for zero trust