Computer Security

Computer security is not something that I’ve been particularly drawn to, but is something that seems to keep falling into my lap. Creating secure systems is a responsibility shared by all engineers but I also tended to be involved in the foundational and organization-wide solutions as an engineer, and in my current architectural role security is a constant consideration. While I’ve tended to intermittently look in to security concerns I’m recently seeking to maintain a decent level of expertise given that it has recurred so frequently throughout my career.

While most companies now recognize the importance of security and are likely to establish commensurate practices, in my estimation many such efforts are likely to be either ineffective due to attempting to blindly overlay policies or technologies without appropriate means for validation which may translate to little more than security theater{atime=“2024-06-04} …or worse they can counter-productive through effectively restricting the application of more stringent controls. The former concern will be a a recurring theme and will therefore be left alone for now, but the latter is worth a brief speaking to. Often access to manage controls themselves are restricted to a small set of operators and tools but the ability to modify such controls is a crucial enabler for granting least privilege{atime”2024-06-04”}. If the gates introduced inhibit such flexible configuration (likely instead offering coarser canned options) then it both undermines that principle and is also likely a symptom of larger issues that may reflect a false sense of security. This particular type of issue is better addressed through an automated (continuous delivery) workflow which preserves the flexibility without slowing feedback cycles in lower environments nor overloading infrastructure teams while still allowing for oversight and restricted access to production environments.

Even in cases when practices lead to clear gross benefits, net value is optimized when security is clearly an enabler rather than a perceived source of friction.

Bruce Schneier has been passing across my radar very often recently (before I resolved (and was assigned) digging more into security) and so I’ll start working my way through some of his material. I find it somewhat interesting that Inrupt is not listed on his Wikipedia page but since I’ve not yet gotten around to contributing to Wikipedia I’ll just note that here.

Internet of Things (IOT) systems have a particularly shaky footing in terms of security which is of particular interest to me given that it is a space in which I currently work. Often this is somewhat complicated by the constraints imposed on embedded systems but should always be given appropriate attention particularly given the (typically) larger surface area. There are also additional challenges around coordinating the secure introductions needed to onboard devices along with prospectively attesting their provenance which is a growing concern that transcends IoT.

In domains such as health care privacy is both clearly and legally paramount, but similar attention is warranted in an expanding breadth of domains.

Attack Vectors

There are limitless ways in which security can be compromised which includes side-channel and fingerprinting attacks that may only be countered through what amounts to convolution of typical behaviors. It is therefore essential to drive security assessments with threat models and pragmatism rather than being seduced into attempting to address all prospective vulnerabilities. It is not only unlikely to be worthwhile pursuing such an effort, some of the prospective risks may involve aggressors that are far more sophisticated than most organizations could guard against. This can often lead to muddied systems and security that is ultimately weakened where more attention is paid to phantoms than to more standard and significant security concerns at the cost of the security of the overall system. The vulnerabilities that warrant attention are certainly contingent on the requirements of the system being designed, but in all cases should be driven by a coherent and validatable model rather than a grab bag of anything possible.

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